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Abstract 
 
 
This paper argues against evidential decision-theory, by showing that the newest responses to its 
biggest current problem – the medical Newcomb problems – don’t work.  The latest approach is 
described, and the arguments of two main proponents of it – Huw Price and CR Hitchcock – 
examined.  It is argued that since neither new defence is successful, causation remains essential 
to understanding means-end agency. 
 
 
1 Coco and the Evidential-Causal Debate in Decision Theory 
 
 
Suppose Coco is trying to decide whether to accept a Mars Bar offered to him.  Coco 
knows that he often suffers from migraine soon after eating chocolate.  But Coco is 
also aware that he often suffers from a pre-migrainous state, PMS, that causes him 
both to crave chocolate, and suffer from migraine.  Should Coco accept chocolate? 
 
A causal decision theorist says ‘yes’.  Causalists hold that agents should act only 
when they have reason to believe that their action is likely to cause the desired 
outcome.  In the Coco case migraine is merely correlated with chocolate eating.  
Chocolate eating will not cause migraine, so Coco should go ahead and eat chocolate 
if he wants it. 
 
It seems an evidential decision theorist must say ‘no’.  The evidentialist advocates 
choosing possible actions according to whether they are evidence or not for a 
particular desired result.  Its claim is that an agent should choose those actions that 
render the result they desire most probable, or at the very least more probable if they 
perform the action than if they don’t.  But it is more likely that Coco will get migraine 
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if he eats chocolate than if he doesn’t, because his eating chocolate is evidence for 
him already being in PMS.  So Coco should refuse chocolate as a means to avoiding 
migraine. 
 
It is almost universally agreed that Coco should have his chocolate, so this case is 
presented by causal decision theorists as a damaging counterexample to evidential 
decision theory.  In general, this problem for evidentialists appears in every case 
where the desired result and the contemplated action share a common cause outwith 
the control of the deliberating agent.  These are the medical Newcomb problems. 
 
Causalists claim that the medical Newcomb problems show that causation is 
fundamental to agency, and hence that an evidential decision theory could never be 
adequate.  This debate between causal and evidential decision theory is interesting 
because it explores important implications for the nature of agency, so long as 
decision theory is seen as a genuine attempt to model agency, to understand what 
agents are doing and ought to do in order to be successful in action.1 
 
Evidential responses to the medical Newcomb problems have been attempts to show 
that evidential decision theory is not committed to prescribing that Coco reject 
chocolate.  The favourite past defence has been the tickle defence.  Very briefly, 
                                                 
1
 The causal-evidential debate is fundamental to this understanding.  James Joyce argues that all 
decision theory is either causal or evidential, whether or not it is made explicit.  All mathematical 
formalisations in decision theory come with tacit principles about what sort of decision problem you 
can legitimately apply the mathematical formalisation to.  For example, certain formalisations are 
inappropriate for situations in which the probability of the background state of the world varies 
according to the action being chosen.  Joyce says that causal decision theory is concerned with 
investigating these tacit principles, and that all decision theory needs to pay attention to them.  Once a 
decision theory does that, Joyce thinks it will expose itself as either evidential or causal. (Joyce, 
especially section 1)  I agree.  The issue of whether you can describe agency accurately without 
reference to causes is vital to understanding agency.  This is particularly interesting to me because I 
want to know whether you can have a genuinely non-circular agency theory of causation, but the issue 
is significant for other reasons too.  For example, Nancy Cartwright thinks that decision-problems like 
this are actually evidence for the existence of deeper causal relations.  (Cartwright Ch 1)  She takes the 
need to refer to causation in correctly characterising agency as a key reason for holding a realism about 
causation. 
 3 
tickle defenders claim that prior causes of an agent’s actions always act via the beliefs 
and desires of the agent.  Further, a rational agent should know his own beliefs and 
desires.  But once the desires of the agent are set, these screen off the contemplated 
action from prior causes.  For Coco this means chocolate is no longer correlated with 
migraine and he can go ahead and have his chocolate.  But this defence has been 
thoroughly discussed in the literature.2  In this paper I want to examine two new 
defences, produced by Huw Price and CR Hitchcock, who are dissatisfied with the 
tickle defence.  Their defences have not yet been appropriately answered.3 
 
This new idea is that rational agents must take up a certain perspective on their own 
deliberation.  It seems to derive from the famous Kantian idea that an agent has to 
regard him or herself as free to see him or herself as genuinely an agent.4  Price talks 
about taking up the 'agent's perspective' and evaluating probabilities from it.  These 
“agent probabilities” are then the ones properly used in deliberation.  Hitchcock 
thinks in deliberation we must “simulate the independent of our actions from factors 
beyond our control.” (Hitchcock, p. 522.)  There seems to be something right in the 
idea that an agent must view him or herself as in some sense free.  Should you happen 
to be locked in a cage and miserably aware of this fact, considering whether to go 
shopping, or to see a film, might be as good a way to pass the time as any other, but it 
is not genuine deliberation.  Here I am going to examine the detailed strategies used 
by Price and Hitchcock, show that their views are in fact quite different, and argue 
that they don't succeed in spite of their intriguing origin. Considering causes is 
essential to successful means-end agency. 
 
 
2 Price and Wide-Ranging Generalisations 
 
 
Price writes that the trouble with the tickle defence is “there is no guarantee that the 
effect of a physiological state on choice behaviour which gives rise to a medical 
                                                 
2  See for example Eells (1982, 1985). 
3  Papineau discusses Hitchcock briefly, but there is more to say. 
4  See for example the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals part III where Kant seems to 
derive morality from freedom.  The relationship seems to reverse in the Critique of Practical Reason, 
but that is a matter for Kant scholarship. 
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Newcomb problem will be mediated by any identifiable craving or tickle.”  (Price 
(1986, p. 203.)  And I take it that it is this realisation which leads Price to attempt a 
different sort of defence of evidential decision-theory in the face of the medical 
Newcomb problems in two papers (1986 and 1991).5 
 
Price claims in both papers that the crux of the problem is the question of when to 
apply statistical generalisations to individual cases, and this is the basis of his 
approach.6  His idea is to save evidential decision theory by arguing that, in the 
crucial cases, the general correlation between eating chocolate and being in PMS or 
having migraines is not applicable to Coco, and Coco will always be in a position to 
realise this crucial fact. 
 
It is certainly true that we sometimes have reasons not to apply generalisations to 
particular cases, and it is also perfectly possible that Coco have such a reason because 
of something he knows about his own deliberation. For example, if you are Coco, and 
you make a decision to eat chocolate with your dinner only and always when a 
tossed coin lands ‘Heads, you can be fairly sure that next Tuesday, when dinnertime 
comes along and you eat your chocolate, this doesn't provide extra evidence that 
you're in PMS and are likely to suffer from migraine later on that evening. While 
there is a correlation between eating chocolate and migraine in the general population, 
there certainly isnt one between coin tossing and migraine. Evidentialists don't 
have to say that Coco must act on an evidential correlation even when he has good 
reason to believe it doesn't apply to him, or, even more narrowly, usually applies to 
him, but doesn't for this particular decision under consideration. This is just a case 
of the 
                                                 
5  In the 1991 paper, p. 64, he says that his argument undermines the 
need for a conceptual distinction between causal and evidential views in decision-theory. My 
arguments will suggest why an evidentialist might think this. But to a causalist there is a distinction, 
and Price falls in the evidentialist camp. I have chosen to use the Coco example because it is Prices 
formulation of the medical Newcomb problem for evidential decision theory. He makes it clear that he 
thinks evidential decision theory 
 needs to allow Coco his chocolate: ‘‘Whether Coco is in PMS or not 
... accepting the Mars Bar will not make any difference. Its evidential bearing ought to be counted 
irrelevant to his decision’’ (Price 1991, p. 162). 
6  He writes: ‘‘as objections to evidential decision theory, medical Newcomb problems depend 
on the claim that spurious correlations translate into spurious evidential dependencies between 
contemplated actions and other events’’ (Price 1991, p. 161). Later he writes: ‘‘At the heart of the 
problem is the issue of the applicability of statistical generalisations to individual cases’’ (Price 1991, 
p. 164). 
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old principle of using the most information available, or the narrowest possible 
reference class.7 
Price thinks Coco would be mistaken in believing that eating this Mars Bar now 
makes it more likely that he is in PMS, and that a parallel mistake would apply to any 
medical Newcomb problem. To make this mistake, Price says Coco: 
has to overlook the fact that his choice to decline is fully explained by the very judgement in 
question (namely the judgement that if he were to decline, that would constitute evidence that he 
is not in PMS).  This judgement has provided him with a reason to decline which is quite 
independent of whether he is in PMS.  Given this judgement, anyone with the same background 
beliefs and desires would make the same choice, regardless of whether he or she was in PMS.  
Given that Coco has made this judgement, in other words, he now has no grounds for taking it 
to be true.  Remember that it rested on his belief about the correlation between PMS and 
chocolate consumption; and its effect is to destroy that correlation.  In similarly motivated 
agents who make this judgement, PMS is simply irrelevant to their resulting decision to choose 
chocolate. (Price 1991, p. 163.)8 
 
So Price's idea is that the motivation to decline out of fear of migraine is itself 
enough to tell Coco the problematic evidential correlation no longer applies to him. 
He writes: ‘‘He [Coco] has no reason to think that in cases in which he has such a 
motivation [i.e. fear of migraine] for eating or declining chocolate, there is any 
correlation between Mars Bars and PMS.’’ (Price 1991, p. 166.) Coco's 
contemplated decision is based on a judgement about accepting chocolate being 
evidence for PMS, but Price's thought is that if a decision to decline chocolate is 
made on the basis of this correlation that usually applies, in that instance the 
correlation will not apply. 
 
It seems to me that this will work in some special cases, but it is not generally true. If 
Cocos deliberations and motivations are very clear to him, there might be some 
occasions when he knows that his only reason for worrying about whether or not to 
eat chocolate is fear of the correlation between eating chocolate and migraine. In such 
a case, Coco would be entitled to reason that his decision about chocolate eating was 
                                                 
7  Price doesn't put the point this way in his 1991, but he does make the connection fairly 
briefly in his 1986. 
8
  Price gives what seems to be the same argument again, but phrased in terms of the causal 
history of the action under consideration, at p. 166. 
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not being affected, in this instance, by PMS, it being ‘‘fully explained’’ by fear of the 
correlation. And in this instance, the correlation will no longer hold of Coco. 
 
But this is going to be a very unusual situation; Coco is seldom going to know all this. 
Decision-making can be very complex. Coco has at least one reason for not accepting 
chocolate, fear of migraine, but he also has a reason for accepting chocolate, 
especially if in PMS -- he wants it! Given this desire, people make and stick to the 
decision to accept chocolate significantly more often when in PMS, and make and 
stick to the decision to decline chocolate significantly more often when not in PMS, 
whatever they actually take their reasons to be. This is why the correlation exists. But 
these effects on their reasoning are not always immediately transparent to the agents 
concerned. On the contrary, human action is subject to many causes, some of which 
act via deliberation in a clear way, while some of them are comparatively opaque. For 
example, it is a well-known fact that when it comes to the intricacies of human 
relationships, especially close family relationships, many people's behaviour can be 
affected by emotions that they may not be aware of, emotions like fear and jealousy. 
Sometimes people are aware of such emotions, of course, but sometimes they are not. 
We also find opaque deliberation in cases of self-deception, which can be simple and 
common. Suppose I interrupt my work to go to the local shop to buy milk. I succeed 
in buying milk but I am grumpy all the way home because they have sold out of Mars 
Bars. It doesn't become clear to me until I am home that my need for milk wasn't 
pressing enough to take time out to go to the shop. My real reason for walking to the 
shop was a suppressed desire for chocolate, affecting my behaviour in a way not 
immediately transparent to me. 
 
So in cases like these, desires affect an agents behaviour in a way the agent may 
find impossible to identify accurately. I think it would be a very unusual agent who 
was self-aware enough to follow all these complexities, and be in a position to know 
precisely what has ‘‘fully explained’’ her action in every case. So it will not generally 
be true that Coco is in a position to know that fear of migraine fully explains his 
choice to decline chocolate. 
 
Price anticipates this response. He realises the causalist will claim that the correlation 
continues to apply to Coco in some cases. Price says this commits the causalist to 
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Coco believing ‘‘Whatever my reasons for consuming or not consuming chocolate, 
there is a positive correlation between my doing so and pre-existing PMS.’’ (Price 
1991, p. 167.) 
 
But the causalist doesn't have to claim anything so strong, or so implausible. If 
Coco does have good reason to believe an evidential correlation does not apply to him 
in a particular case, he should ignore it. I have already described the coin-tossing case 
above, which alone would violate such a belief. The causalist only needs a weaker 
claim for Prices arguments to fall; he only has to insist that there is a correlation 
applying to Coco across cases sufficiently like the case where he decides ‘‘normally’’. 
So long as it is true that Coco chooses to go ahead with chocolate significantly more 
often when he is in PMS, then his decision and action remains evidentially relevant to 
the existence of the prior state. The possible existence of cases using artificial random 
decision procedures like coin tossing, or extremely unusual situations like gun-to-
head eat-or-I-shoot threats where the correlation fails to apply does not help. The 
usual case for agents deciding in medical Newcomb situations are not enough like the 
coin tossing case for the correlation to cease to apply, at least not for all agents in all 
possible medical Newcomb cases. The evidentialist is committed to giving the wrong 
prescription for action in at least some cases. 
It is Price who must claim something implausible for his arguments to work. He needs 
an implausible picture of the reasoning of rational agents, just as the proponent of the 
tickle defence does. For Price, it would have to be true that the particular line of 
reasoning that Price describes was the only cause of agents decisions and actions, 
and agents also know this. It would have to be false that agents could be affected by 
other lines of reasoning that may or may not be clear to them. More opaque effects on 
agents deliberations, such as I have described, would have to be impossible. 
 
And so at root the problem with Price's defence is the same as the problem with the 
tickle defence. The tickle defence demands that, if you are a rational agent, your 
motivations are always clear to you, putting you in a reference class where the 
problematic evidential dependency no longer applies, but many philosophers reject 
that. Price knows this; it is why he too rejects the tickle defence. But Price's defence 
makes analogously implausible claims, about the transparency of deliberation. I have 
argued that agents deliberation does not have to be transparent for it to be counted 
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rational – particularly when this is confined to being means-end rational. Rational 
agents can be affected by motivations whose effect on their decision-making is not 
fully transparent to them. They can be recognised as rational so long as they are 
engaging in successful means-end behaviour. Consider the simple case of self-
deception I described above. Now, whether or not I realise why I am going to the 
shop, it is clearly a sensible means to get chocolate, to satisfy the suppressed desire. 
This behaviour is means-end rational, and so is the behaviour of the agents Price 
describes, even when they cannot be sure that their decision is the only cause of their 
action. Whether such behaviour is rational in any wider sense is not relevant to a 
decision theory, which only attempts to characterise behaviour in pursuit of given 
ends. 
 
Price does not explicitly discuss rationality in this way, but it looks as if he is attracted 
to some sort of picture requiring strong claims about the transparency of deliberation, 
and that he thinks that when a particular line of deliberation is a cause of an action, 
there is no other cause of that action, not even other lines of deliberation. This picture 
would lead him to a strong claim he makes: ‘‘From the agent's point of view 
probabilistic relevance and causal relevance cannot diverge. To introduce the agent is 
in effect to assume an independent causal history to the event A’’. (Price 1991, p. 
169.) The event A is the action of the agent. But this cannot be right. The event A 
could only be assumed to have an independent causal history if we have reason to 
believe the decision of the agent is entirely independent of relevant causal factors 
such as PMS. We might believe this in some cases, where the agent is sure that the 
effects of prior factors on her deliberations are transparent to her, but we couldn't 
possibly believe it true for every case of a deliberate human action in a medical 
Newcomb case. 
 
So Price cannot plausibly claim that human deliberation and decision is fully 
transparent and that one clearly identified reason for action excludes other causes of 
action in the way he requires for his arguments in defence of evidential decision 
theory to be sound. There will still be cases of rational agents deciding in medical 
Newcomb cases where Prices defence of evidential decision theory cannot work, 
because the problematic spurious evidential dependency continues to apply. 
Evidential decision theory will still sometimes prescribe counterintuitive choices. 
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3 Hitchcock and Fictional Distributions 
 
 
Hitchcock (1996) is engaged in a wider project to explore parallels between problems 
in probabilistic theories of causation, and problems in decision theory. He focuses on 
the fact that both use conditional probabilities evaluated within cells of what he calls 
the ‘‘c-partition’’. The ‘‘c-partition’’ is constructed by causalists when they want to 
describe their decision theory probabilistically. It is constructed to distinguish 
correlations that indicate a causal link between action and desired result -- which are 
good to act on – from correlations that are spurious since they indicate no such causal 
link and should not be acted on. Hitchcock notes that a parallel partition is important 
to probabilistic theories of causation, also to distinguish between correlations that 
indicate causal relations, and merely spurious correlations.9 But in the section of the 
paper I am concerned with Hitchcock is looking for a non-causal rationale for using 
the c-partition, and what he gives amounts to a defence of evidential decision theory. 
 
Hitchcock clearly likes Price’s work and in a certain sense his work is an extension of 
Price's.  He writes: 
The Ramsey-Price proposal strikes the right balance: it incorporates the insight that there is 
something funny about deliberating about actions that one knows to be caused by external 
factors, without withholding decision theory from agents that occasionally have their actions so 
caused.  The idea is that rational deliberation demands of an agent that she entertain the fiction 
that her actions are sui generis; deliberation is the determination of what an agent would do if 
she were completely free to act in accordance with her interests.  (Hitchcock p. 520. Emphasis in 
original.) 
So Hitchcock shares Price’s thought that there is something special about the agent’s 
own perspective.  Nevertheless Hitchcock then diverges radically from both Price’s 
                                                 
9  The general idea is numbingly familiar to decision theorists and those working on 
probabilistic theories of causation. Hitchcock explains: ‘‘In Eells’’ theory [of causation], the causal 
relevance of C for E depends upon conditional probabilities within cells of a partition {B1, B2, ...}, 
which we will call the c-partition for C and E. Each cell Bi corresponds to a causally homogeneous 
background context. C is a (positive) cause of E if and only if P(E|C^Bi)>P(E|~C^Bi) for each cell Bi; 
C is a negative cause of E if and only if P(E|C^Bi)<P(E|~C^Bi) for each cell Bi; and C is a mixed cause 
of E if one of the inequalities P(E|C^Bi)>P(E|~C^Bi) or P(E|C^Bi) <P(E|~C^Bi) holds for some cell Bi, 
but not for all cells“ (Hitchcock, p. 510). 
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work and the tickle defence.  Hitchcock is not interested in information that puts you 
in some reference class or other, because he is not interested in reference classes at 
all.  Unlike either Price or the tickle defence, Hitchcock is not concerned with agents 
acting on a real probability distribution.  What Hitchcock does is construct a fictional 
probability distribution based on explicit assumptions that he derives from the 
Ramsey-Price proposal, and claim that agents should act on an evidential decision 
rule, using this fictional probability distribution.10 
 
Formally, this seems to work. Hitchcock describes how to construct his fictional 
probability distribution, Pf, and, in the appendix to his paper, proves that when 
reasoning evidentially using it an agent will arrive at the right prescriptions for action 
in the medical Newcomb cases. That is, reasoning evidentially using Hitchcock's 
fictional probability distribution is formally equivalent to reasoning using the 
standard causal criterion, and the real probability distribution. I don't want to 
dispute this. 
 
Nevertheless, this isn't enough to defend evidential decision theory. What is needed 
is some reason for thinking that the reasoning Hitchcock describes is a good way of 
thinking about rational mean-send reasoning. After all, there could be indefinitely 
many systems for constructing a fictional probability distribution plus wrong criterion 
                                                 
10  Hitchcock is quite explicit about this distribution being fictional. He writes that the 
assumption he advocates, the assumption the fictional distribution models, is an ‘‘assumption of a 
freedom of action which may, as a matter of fact, not exist’’ (Hitchcock, p. 523). In the light of this, it 
is worth noting that I have generally assumed some external constraints on probabilities used in 
decision theory. I have not concerned myself with the debate over objective versus subjective 
probabilities in decision theory because it is a vexing debate tangential to the issues here. In a nutshell 
this is because both Price and Hitchcock accept that the existence of a genuine correlation in the 
general population between chocolate eating and migraine, and Coco's beliefs about that correlation, 
is what generates the problem in the first place. In more detail, Price is inclined to favour subjective 
probabilities in decision-making, 
 but he isnt aiming to convince only those who agree with him on that. He also presumably 
thinks subjective probabilities in some sense track more objective facts, since the entire focus of his 
argument is on how Coco comes to know that the correlation really does not apply to him. Hitchcock 
makes it quite clear he thinks rational degrees of belief will be guided by beliefs about objective 
probabilities. He writes ‘‘In other words, our beliefs about the objective probabilities that constitute the 
various relations of causal relevance will guide our deliberations’’ (p. 518). Hitchcock's fictional 
distribution is different, of course. I do dislike the very idea. It would take a very strong argument to 
persuade me that it could be a requirement of rationality that you act on probabilities even when you 
know they are false, and it may be quite impossible to believe a falsehood, rather than merely pretend 
that a falsehood is true. Nevertheless, these views are incidental to my criticism of Hitchcock, which 
focuses on a possible rationale for the assumption of freedom he recommends. 
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for reasoning that nevertheless yielded correct prescriptions for action, because 
together they were formally equivalent to the causal criterion plus the correct 
probability distribution. For Hitchcock's work to be a convincing defence of 
evidential decision theory, there needs to be an argument that using the fictional 
probability distribution plus the evidential criterion is the right way to think of 
means-end reasoning. There must be a rationale for using the fictional distribution, 
and one that is more convincing than that for using real probabilities and a causal 
criterion. 
 
Hitchcock seems to think there is a further story. He says that construction of this 
fictitious distribution is intended to formalise Price's work.11  He also summarises 
his position: ‘‘we evaluate our actions in terms of these probabilities because they 
allow us to simulate the independence of our actions from factors beyond our control. 
Rational deliberation requires that we view our actions in this way, even if only in 
fiction’’ (Hitchcock, pp. 521--522). I am going to disentangle two ways in turn of 
constructing the necessary rationale for using the fictional distribution from 
Hitchcock's work, and argue that neither is convincing. The first fails because it is 
implausible that we should take rational means-end action so, while the second cannot 
establish the necessary formal equivalence with the causal criterion plus the correct 
probability distribution. 
 
So what kind of ‘‘independence’’ or ‘‘freedom’’ is Hitchcock's fictional distribution 
meant to simulate. Hitchcock characterises his view: To evaluate her own actions, the 
agent must ‘‘entertain the fiction that her actions are sui generis, which, following 
Price, we will take to mean probabilistically independent of factors that are beyond 
her control.’’ (Hitchcock, p. 521.) This and remarks above and elsewhere in 
Hitchcocks paper strongly suggest the first kind of freedom I will discuss: that 
                                                 
11
  Hitchcock says he intends to take the Ramsey-Price proposal and make it mathematically 
precise. He writes: ‘‘It would be nice to have a clearer mathematical picture of what Price's agent 
probabilities are’’, and: ‘‘There is something deeply right about the idea that deliberation requires that 
contemplated actions be viewed as sui generis.’’ (Hitchcock, p. 519) This is what he is taking from 
Price's work. It is 
 worth noting that I am going to criticise Hitchcock's attempt to defend evidential decision 
theory by constructing a fictional probability distribution, but there is a great deal more interesting 
work in that paper on the relation between decision theory and probabilistic theories of causation which 
I will not touch on. 
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agents must treat their own actions as if uncaused by external factors and 
probabilistically independent of them. 
 
The formal criteria Hitchcock gives for construction of the fictional distribution Pf 
seem to accord with this.  First, Hitchcock says, the probability of an agent choosing 
action A can be arbitrarily assigned (by that agent), for the fictional distribution Pf.  
Secondly, and much more importantly, in Pf  the actions should be independent of the 
members of the c-partition, so that Pf (A1&factor x) always equals Pf (A1) times Pf 
(factor x).12   This just states that the probability of any action 1 and any factor x, is 
the same as the probability of action 1 holding multiplied by the probability of factor 
x holding.  This states that action 1 and factor x are independent.  The agent must 
assume in her own fictional distribution that her actions are independent of any prior 
factors.  And this must be what models the freedom of action – the fiction – Hitchcock 
says the agent must assume.  This is because apart from these two points, the fictional 
distribution “Pf should otherwise be as similar to Pd as possible. … suffices that Pf 
agree with Pd about the relative likelihood of various factors beyond the agent’s 
control, and about how her acts, in conjunction with these factors, influence the 
occurrence of the various possible outcomes.”  (Hitchcock, p. 521. Emphasis added.) 
 
Hitchcock's story can be examined and contrasted with Price's using Coco. 
Hitchcock is arguing that evidential and causal decision theory give the same 
prescriptions for action for Coco when Coco makes the necessary assumptions about 
his freedom to act. Hitchcock thinks Coco should allocate Pf (eating chocolate) = 
some arbitrary 
number between 0 and 1. But this is not the crucial claim. That is that Coco should, in 
Pf, assume that the probability of any action is independent of prior factors. Hitchcock 
is saying that Coco should, to be rational, assume that his eating chocolate is not 
correlated with any pre-existing PMS -- indeed, Coco should assume his action is 
independent of any possible pre-existing state. 
 
                                                 
12
  What Hitchcock actually writes is: “1) Pf (Aj) = pj, with Σj pj = 1” and then, “Pf should satisfy: 
2) Pf (AjBk) = Pf (Aj)Pf (Bk) for all j and k.” (p521)  I have merely standardised notation and expressed 
the same thought in the terminology I have been using all along. 
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On Price's view Coco ends up in a very similar position, but Price tells a different 
story. Price identifies the causal history of Coco's contemplated action and provides 
an argument to support the view that in the problematic cases Coco will know that the 
troublesome spurious correlations don't apply. Coco acts on real correlations. For 
Hitchcock, Coco uses a purely fictional distribution. 
 
So the freedom Hitchcock thinks agents must assume is modelled by (i) arbitrary 
allocation of a probability to an action and (ii) assumption that an action under 
consideration is independent of any prior factors. It is not clear whether these two 
assumptions are separate parts of the assumption of freedom, or meant to be linked. 
For Coco, the important correlation is of course between being in PMS and eating 
chocolate, and perhaps the idea is that if Coco is free to allocate the probability of 
himself eating chocolate, then Coco must assume that his eating of chocolate is 
uncorrelated with other things like prior causes that would affect the absolute 
probability of Coco eating chocolate. But this does not follow. It could be true that 
Coco can allocate an arbitrary probability to his action (especially a fictional one) 
while this action is still correlated with prior states. So the assumption that there are 
no spurious correlations has to stand alone -- it has to follow from the assumption of 
freedom. 
 
But if this is the picture, then Hitchcock is committed to claims that must be false. 
That Coco has to assume that his action is uncaused, or uncorrelated with events we 
normally take to be in its causal history, in order to deliberate rationally cannot be 
true. In fact, it sounds a very odd thing to try to do. Why should Coco, knowing that 
his chocolate-eating is often caused by PMS, and that there is a corresponding 
correlation between chocolate-eating and PMS, have to try to ignore that knowledge 
and believe the opposite, i.e. believe that there is no such correlation, in order to act 
rationally? This is a very strong claim that is now quite different from its Kantian 
antecedents, and the intuitive plausibility of ‘‘deliberation’’ about whether to go 
shopping while locked in a cage not counting as genuine deliberation. Indeed, 
information about prior causes can be highly relevant to rational choices. Take the 
case of family relationships involving complex emotions I mentioned earlier. Your 
ability to recognise that your impulse to be mean to your sister arises from foolish 
jealousy caused by childhood events might be crucial to your ability to ignore 
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impulses and forge a healthy adult relationship with your sister. Hitchcock must say 
more to justify such a move, particularly when the causalist has a sensible story about 
why rational agents should act on causes and real probabilities.13 
 
As I suggested earlier, there is a second possible, and more plausible, assumption of 
freedom Hitchcock might have in mind. Perhaps he wasn't thinking that an agent 
must take her actions to be uncaused by prior factors, just that those prior factors must 
cause the actions of a rational agent via her own motivations -- the favourite 
assumption of the tickle defenders. Hitchcock only means that an agent, in treating 
herself as a free agent, should not worry about prior causes of a contemplated action, 
and instead just take current motivations and decide on the basis of them. This is 
weaker, since Hitchcock could accept that Coco's decision about chocolate involves 
many causal influences, some of them correlated with the desired result, and can 
even allow that Coco knows this. Hitchcock is only requiring that Coco assumes that 
these causal influences act via his own beliefs and desires. Coco doesn't have to 
worry about them, because they are taken into account along with his beliefs and 
desires. 
 
If this is Hitchcock's story then it is a good deal more plausible. And it won't fall 
to my objections to Price since Hitchcock doesn't require that the agent can tell what 
is causing her action. On the new reading the story applying to Coco goes: Coco 
wants to eat chocolate. Since he takes himself to be free to act he cannot worry about 
PMS 
                                                 
13
  There may be a lingering thought that the system Hitchcock describes is better because it is 
simpler. I think this is misleading. Hitchcock is not saying evidentialists can get away with assuming 
their actions are causally and probabilistically independent of prior states, and just acting on raw 
correlations. This would, after all, lead to Coco avoiding chocolate. On Hitchcock's picture Coco will 
still need to do a 
 tricky bit of figuring out. I quote again Hitchcock describing how the fictional distribution 
does not differ from the real one: ‘‘Pf should otherwise be as similar to Pd as possible. ... suffices that 
Pf  agree with Pd about the relative likelihood of various factors beyond the agents control, and about 
how her acts, in conjunction with these factors, influence the occurrence of the various possible 
outcomes’’ 
 (Hitchcock, p. 521. Emphasis added). This last part is going to be difficult, but it is the only 
way Hitchcock's criterion for action could end up formally equivalent to the causal criterion. Agents 
need this causal information to act effectively in such cases, and it cannot be got around. Hitchcock is 
not giving us a simpler system, just an odd story in favour of the same criterion the causalist advocates 
acting on. 
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causing him to act. He should only consider his current motivations, so he should eat 
chocolate. It is more reasonable to assume that your actions are entirely determined 
only by your motivations and reasoning, than that they are uncaused by prior factors 
at all. 
 
Unfortunately for Hitchcock, the second more plausible sort of assumption is not 
enough to generate his fictional distribution. Since an agent's motivations will still 
be correlated with desired results, via common causes, his actions will also still be 
correlated with desired results. Desired results will share a common cause with some 
actions, in the form of causes of certain motivations of the agent. Whether or not 
Coco is worrying about past causes of his current motivations, Coco eating chocolate 
will still be correlated with future migraine, and if Coco is reasoning evidentially he 
should refuse chocolate. So the weaker and more plausible assumption could not 
generate the criterion formally identical to the causal criterion, as Hitchcock says 
the assumption will. If Hitchcock's fictional distribution is to generate a criterion the 
same as the causal criterion, Hitchcock needs the agent to make the assumption of 
radical freedom. It is no accident that it is this claim that is formalised in the 
mathematically framed assumptions Hitchcock uses to generate the new criterion. His 
claim cannot be weakened; his formal description of this assumption must stand. 
 
This suggests that this approach is never going to work. If the assumption of freedom 
made is strong enough so that reasoning evidentially using it gets the right 
prescriptions for action, then that assumption of freedom is going to be implausible. 
Getting the right answer on what actions to perform is not enough to establish that 
Hitchcock has described a reasonable way of deliberating about action. He has merely 
given us the causal criterion and a bizarre account of how he gets it using an 
unmotivated fiction that is forced to use implausible assumptions. The causalist gives 
the causal criterion, with a sensible account of why it is the right way to reason in 
those circumstances. Hitchcock's account cannot stand up in comparison. 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
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The general evidentialist attempt to use facts about the application of general 
correlations, and assumptions of freedom to evade medical Newcomb problems 
doesn't work. It springs from an interesting idea that's been intuitively plausible in 
outline to many. Nevertheless, I have described two different ways of using it and 
argued that once examined in details these attempts fail. Price provides a genuinely 
evidential account, but is forced to impose too-high standards for rationality, while 
Hitchcock is forced to make implausible claims about freedom. This means that the 
only plausible rationale for the criterion he gives that is formally equivalent to the 
causal criterion is the causal story, which would make him a causalist. Evidential 
decision theory must find another way to evade the medical Newcomb problems. 
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